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DO INTERVIEWERS MODERATE THE EFFECT OF
MONETARY INCENTIVES ON RESPONSE RATES IN
HOUSEHOLD INTERVIEW SURVEYS?
ELIUD KIBUCHI*
PATRICK STURGIS
GABRIELE B. DURRANT
OLGA MASLOVSKAYA
As citizens around the world become ever more reluctant to respond to
survey interview requests, incentives are playing an increasingly impor-
tant role in maintaining response rates. In face-to-face surveys, inter-
viewers are the key conduit of information about the existence and level
of any incentive offered and, therefore, potentially moderate the effec-
tiveness with which an incentive translates nonproductive addresses into
interviews. Yet, while the existing literature on the effects of incentives
on response rates is substantial, little is currently known about the role of
interviewers in determining whether or not incentives are effective. In
this article, we apply multilevel models to three different face-to-face in-
terview surveys from the United Kingdom, which vary in their sample
designs and incentive levels, to assess whether some interviewers are
more successful than others in using incentives to leverage cooperation.
Additionally, we link the response outcome data to measures of inter-
viewer characteristics to investigate whether interviewer variability on
this dimension is systematically related to level of experience and
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9
demographic characteristics. Our results show significant and substantial
variability between interviewers in the effectiveness of monetary incen-
tives on the probability of cooperation across all three surveys.
However, none of the interviewer characteristics considered are signifi-
cantly associated with more or less successful interviewers.
KEYWORDS: Face-to-face; Incentives; Interviewers; Multilevel.
1. INTRODUCTION
It is widely acknowledged that low and declining response rates pose an exis-
tential threat to conventional approaches to data collection in survey research
(Brick and Williams 2013; Couper 2013; Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan 2015;
Miller 2017). In response to this pressing challenge, survey methodologists
have invested considerable time and resources into investigating features of the
survey process which can be leveraged to increase the probability of coopera-
tion among sampled units (Groves and Couper 1998; Groves and Heeringa
2006). As the primary interface between survey organizations and sample
members, interviewers are key to this endeavour (Morton-Williams 1993;
Campanelli, Sturgis, and Purdon 1997; West and Blom 2017). They are a key
factor in response rates for household interview surveys remaining substan-
tially higher than all other available modes, although they also come at a com-
mensurately higher cost. A large number of studies in a broad range of
contexts have now established that demographic, attitudinal, and behavioral
differences between interviewers can account for substantial variability in re-
sponse rates (Hox and de Leeuw 2002; Hansen 2006; Durrant, Groves, and
Steele 2010). For example, Campanelli and O’Muircheartaigh (1999) found
that more experienced interviewers were more successful at obtaining contact
and cooperation due to more effective calling patterns and an ability to tailor
the survey request to sample members’ motivations and concerns.
In addition to interviewers, monetary incentives of various kinds have
played a central role in strategies for maximising survey cooperation (Singer,
Groves, and Corning 1999; Singer, Hoewyk, Gebler, Raghunathan, and
Mcgonagle 1999; Singer 2002). Monetary incentives are considered to operate
by acting as a replacement for other nonpecuniary motivations for survey par-
ticipation such as interest in the survey topic, enjoyment of social interaction,
or a sense of civic duty (Singer et al. 1999; Groves, Singer, and Corning
2000). A large body of evidence, predominantly based on randomized experi-
ments, has established that monetary incentives exert a small to moderate posi-
tive effect on response rates and that larger incentives tend to produce more
substantial effects but with diminishing marginal returns (Church 1993; Singer
et al. 1999; Cantor, O’Hare, and O’Connor 2008; Singer and Ye 2013).
Given the sustained focus on the role of interviewers and monetary incen-
tives in the existing survey methodological literature, it is surprising that their
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potential joint influence has seldom been considered. Because interviewers
play such a key role in making contact with and persuading sample members to
participate, it is plausible that interviewers vary in how effective they are at
leveraging incentives to persuade sample members to provide an interview. For
example, some interviewers may tailor their doorstep introductions to highlight
the availability of a monetary incentive at households that are most likely to be
sensitive to them (Campanelli et al. 1997; Groves and Couper 1998). Similarly,
interviewers may feel more confident in their doorstep approach when they
know an incentive is available, which may positively affect their persuasive
efforts (Singer and Ye 2013). This joint influence is our focus in this article. We
analyze data from three different face-to-face interview surveys that included a
randomized incentive experiment to identify interviewer influences on the effec-
tiveness of monetary incentives in promoting survey cooperation.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: We first provide short
reviews of the respective literatures on how interviewers and monetary incen-
tives influence survey response, before setting out our expectations regarding
the moderating effect of interviewers on the effectiveness of incentives. We
then describe the three surveys that form the basis of our analysis and the ad-
ministrative data on interviewers and areas to which they are linked. This is
followed by an exposition of our analysis strategy and presentation of our key
findings. We conclude with a consideration of the limitations of our study, a
discussion of the implications of our findings for improving survey practice
and suggestions on how future research in this area might usefully proceed.
1.1 The Effect of Interviewers on Response Rates
Face-to-face surveys consistently achieve higher response rates than those un-
dertaken by self-administration or by telephone, a difference that is largely at-
tributable to the role of interviewers. Interviewers locate and make repeated
calls at sampled addresses, thereby keeping noncontacts to a minimum
(Campanelli et al. 1997). Having made contact with a household, they undertake
a number of additional tasks including respondent selection within households,
conveying information about the survey such as the topic, sponsor, likely dura-
tion of the interview, and the availability of incentives (Couper and Schlegel
1998). They also often provide accompanying information about the survey in
the form of copies of advanced letters (which will not have been read by all
sample members) , provide reassurance about the bona fides of the survey, and
show identity documentation (Groves and Couper 1998; Groves et al. 2000).
Interviewers also persuade reluctant respondents to provide an interview,
thereby minimizing refusals. A range of dispositional factors and behavioral
styles have been identified as important in determining how successful inter-
viewers are at preventing refusals. These include an ability to maintain an in-
teraction rather than accept a refusal and to tailor their approach on the
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doorstep to specific characteristics of sample units by identifying and present-
ing aspects of the survey that they judge are likely to be positively valued
(Morton-Williams 1993; Campanelli et al 1997; Groves and Couper 1998). For
example, an interviewer may remark upon the respondent’s garden if they per-
ceive that gardening is likely to be a hobby of the householder, or they might
highlight the topic of the survey if they judge from the observable characteris-
tics of the sample member that it is likely to be of interest. Studies which have
examined the causes of noncontact and refusal have consistently found signifi-
cant interviewer effects across a range of sample designs and international con-
texts (Campanelli et al. 1997; Hox and de Leeuw 2002; Durrant and Steele
2009; Durrant et al. 2010). For example, Blom, de Leeuw, and Hox (2011)
found interviewer intraclass correlation coefficients of 0.27 for noncontact and
0.08 for cooperation across ten countries in the 2008 European Social Survey.
Existing research has also considered which characteristics of interviewers
are important in producing these effects (Blom and Korbmacher 2013). This
has found that experienced interviewers tend to be better at tailoring their
approaches to household idiosyncrasies and concerns (Groves and Couper
1998; Lemay and Durand 2002). More experienced interviewers, both in terms
of experience on the particular survey and of interviewing more generally,
have also been found to obtain higher response rates, even though they are of-
ten allocated to more difficult areas (Purdon, Campanelli, and Sturgis 1999;
West and Blom 2017). Other studies have found that interviewers with higher
levels of self-confidence and more positive appraisals of the likelihood of
achieving interviews also obtain higher cooperation rates, an effect which is
thought to arise from the positive effect of confidence on the quality of door-
step interactions (Singer and Kohnke-Aguirre 1979; Groves and Couper 1998;
Hox and de Leeuw 2002). The existing evidence suggests that interviewer
skills and experience in recognizing, interpreting, and addressing visual cues
and the confidence and self-belief with which interviewers approach the task
of obtaining cooperation on the doorstep are the key mechanisms through
which interviewers influence individual cooperation decisions.
1.2 Using Incentives to Increase Response Rates
Under the influential “leverage-salience” theory of survey cooperation (Groves
et al. 2000), incentives are postulated to work by acting as a replacement for non-
financial motivating factors such as engagement in the topic of the survey, enjoy-
ment of social interaction, and a sense of civic or moral obligation. Incentives
may also invoke norms of reciprocity, such that respondents feel a sense of obli-
gation to provide an interview when they are offered or receive an incentive be-
fore the interview request is made (Dillman, Smyth, and Christian 2009).
The field of survey research has benefited from a wealth of systematic
reviews and meta-analyses of the effects of survey incentives which have
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yielded a robust set of conclusions. We know from this body of evidence that
monetary incentives are more effective in motivating participation than non-
monetary incentives such as pens, calendars, diaries, and so on (Church 1993;
Cantor et al. 2008; Singer and Ye 2013). It is also well established that prepaid
(or unconditional) incentives tend to produce more substantial effects on re-
sponse rates than those that are promised (or conditional) on completion of the
survey (Church 1993; Singer et al. 1999; Cantor et al. 2008; Lavrakas 2008),
though it does not follow from this that they are necessarily more cost-effective
(Brick, Montaquila, Hagedorn, Roth, and Chapman 2005). It is also apparent
from these studies that the effect of incentives is greater for self-completion sur-
veys and surveys that have a low response rate when no incentive is offered, pre-
sumably because there is more scope for the incentive to act as a replacement for
nonmonetary motivations among a larger pool of potential nonrespondents
(Singer et al. 1999; Mercer, Caporaso, Cantor, and Townsend 2015).
Researchers have also established that the magnitude of the effect of incen-
tives on response rates increases with the size of the incentive. For instance, in
a meta-analysis of thirty-nine experimental studies, Singer, Groves, and
Corning (1999) found that each dollar of incentive paid resulted in one-third of
a percentage point increase in response rate compared with the no incentive
condition. However, other studies have found that this “dose-response” rela-
tionship is curvilinear, with the size of the increase in the response rate declin-
ing with additional increases in the value of the monetary incentive (Gelman,
Stevens, and Chan 2002; Cantor et al. 2008; Mercer et al. 2015). In sum, the
existing evidence demonstrates that monetary incentives have a robust, posi-
tive effect on the probability of survey cooperation.
1.3 The Joint Effect of Interviewers and Incentives on Response Rates
We know that interviewers and incentives have a positive influence on re-
sponse rates, but what of their joint effect? It seems plausible that interviewers
might moderate the effect of incentives on cooperation probability for three
inter-related reasons. First, interviewers are the primary conduit of information
between survey organization and sample members and are, therefore, essential
to ensuring that potential respondents are aware that an incentive is available.
While most surveys will highlight incentives in an advanced letter, many
respondents do not open—let alone read—them (Stoop 2005). Furthermore, it
seems reasonable to assume that those who do not read advanced letters—
those who are busy and/or uninterested in the survey topic—are also more
likely to be susceptible to monetary incentives. Second, interviewers may have
more confidence in the likelihood of obtaining an interview when a monetary
incentive is offered. This might exert an additional positive effect on coopera-
tion over and above the influence of the incentive on respondents because
higher levels of confidence improve the quality of interviewer approaches
Interviewers and Incentives Effects on Cooperation Rates 5 Do
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(Groves and Couper 1996; Singer et al. 1999; Singer and Ye 2013). Third,
interviewers may vary in the extent to which they tailor their doorstep intro-
ductions by highlighting the availability of the incentive at addresses where
they believe it is likely to be effective. For example, some interviewers might
ask sample members whether they received the letter with information about the
payment at an early stage of the interaction, while others do not mention it at all.
Existing research, however, offers little in the way of hard evidence on the
question of whether or not interviewers moderate the effects of monetary
incentives on cooperation probability. An exception is Singer, Hoewyk, and
Maher (2000), who investigated the influence of interviewer expectations on
the effect of incentives on cooperation rates using data from the Survey of
Consumer Attitudes, a telephone survey of the American public. Singer and
Maher randomly assigned interviewers and respondents to three groups: in
groups one and two, respondents received an advance letter and a $5 uncondi-
tional incentive, while respondents in group three received an advance letter
but no incentive. Interviewers in group one were unaware of the incentive, but
interviewers in groups two and three were made aware of the incentive level
via messages on their computers. Interviewers in groups one and two achieved
response rates of 76 percent and 75 percent, respectively, compared with 62
percent for interviewers in group three. Singer, Hoewyk, and Maher (2000)
concluded that, although the unconditional incentive boosted response, inter-
viewer expectations about the likely cooperativeness of sample members had
no additional effect. Lynn (2001) found similar evidence from a focus group of
interviewers that expectations about the likely impact of incentives on coopera-
tion bore little resemblance to actual response outcomes. While these studies
support the conclusion that incentives operate primarily or exclusively via their
effects on respondents rather than on interviewers, they do not rule out the pos-
sibility that interviewers vary in the effectiveness with which they deploy
incentives. We turn next to a direct empirical assessment of this question.
2. DATA
We use data from three different United Kingdom face-to-face interview sur-
veys. These are the 2015 National Survey for Wales Field Test (NSW2015),
the 2016 National Survey for Wales Incentive Experiment (NSW2016), and
wave one of the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study Innovation
Panel (UKHLS-IP). All three surveys use stratified random sampling, with
addresses selected from the Postcode Address File. The two Welsh surveys
randomly select one eligible adult (aged sixteen and over), while UKHLS-IP
attempts interviews with all eligible adults (aged eighteen and over) in the
household. For UKHLS-IP, a cooperating household is defined as one in which
at least one eligible adult provided an interview. The NSW2015 randomly allo-
cated 50 percent of addresses to receive no incentive and 50 percent to receive
6 Kibuchi et al. Do
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£10; NSW2016 also used a 50/50 allocation but with a treatment condition of
£5 and a control condition of no incentive. The UKHSL-IP randomly allocated
one-third of addresses to receive a £5 incentive, one-third of addresses to re-
ceive £5 rising to £10 conditional on all household members completing the
survey, and one-third to receive £10. For the analyses presented here, the latter
two groups are combined. Incentives in all three surveys were offered condi-
tional on completion of the questionnaire, and allocation of addresses to exper-
imental conditions was implemented within interviewer workloads. We use
response outcomes before any re-issuing in order to ensure that the random as-
signment of incentives within interviewers is maintained. However, detailed
first issue outcomes were not available for the UKHLS-IP, so we are only able
to model response/nonresponse for this survey rather than cooperation condi-
tional on contact. Analysis of the two Welsh surveys shows that the results are
substantively the same for both response and cooperation, so we do not con-
sider this to be an important limitation. More detailed information about the de-
sign of each survey is provided in the appendix.
Each survey was linked to administrative data held on interviewers by the
respective survey agencies. These were age, sex, and experience (number of
years working for the agency). We use these variables to assess whether inter-
viewer characteristics are associated with variability in the effectiveness of
deploying incentives. For the UKHLS-IP, we also link aggregate census varia-
bles from the 2011 census to the sample file. A total of twenty-one census
count variables were combined using a factorial ecology model (Rees 1971),
with a total of five neighborhood indices extracted. These measures cover the
extent of “concentrated disadvantage” (areas with a higher number of single
parent families, those on income support and unemployed, fewer people in
managerial and professional occupations, and less owner occupiers),
“urbanicity” (high population density and domestic properties, and relatively
little green space), and “population mobility” (higher levels of in- and out-
migration and more single person households). We also account for differences
in the neighborhood age structure (with higher scores for areas with a younger
population), housing structure (higher scores for areas with more terraced and
vacant properties), and the police recorded crime rate. We model both the re-
sponse rate and the cooperation rate. Response rate is defined based on
AAPOR RR2 (AAPOR 2016) as,
RR ¼
Iþ Pð Þ
Iþ Pð Þ þ Rþ NCþ Oð Þ þ UE NCð Þ þ UEð Þ
;
where RR denotes Response Rate, I denotes interview, P denotes partial inter-
views, R denotes refusals, NC denotes noncontacts, O denotes other unproduc-
tive, UE(NC) denotes unknown eligibility (noncontacted), and UE denotes
unknown eligibility. The cooperation rate (CR) conditions on those contacted
and is defined as
Interviewers and Incentives Effects on Cooperation Rates 7 Do
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CR ¼
Iþ Pð Þ
Iþ Pþ Rð Þ
:
Response outcomes for the three surveys are presented in table 1. The response
rates were higher in the incentive condition for all three surveys, with the
NSW2015 and NSW2016 having a 3 and 2 percentage points higher coopera-
tion rates for the incentivized households respectively and the UKHLS-IP hav-
ing a 5 percentage points higher response rate in the incentive condition. The
difference is statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence (using
a v2 test) for UKHLS-IP and NSW2015 but not for NSW2016.
Table 1 demonstrates the cooperation rate was higher in the incentivized
condition for all three surveys, though the difference was statistically signifi-
cant in only one. Next, we proceed to a multivariate analysis to assesses
whether these average differences in cooperation rates are constant across
interviewers or whether some interviewers are more successful at using the in-
centive to convert refusals into interviews.
3. ANALYSIS
The influence of interviewers on the effectiveness of incentives on survey co-
operation and response is assessed using multilevel logistic regression models
(Hox and de Leeuw 2002; Durrant and Steele 2009; Goldstein 2010). The
model applied here has the following form: Let yij denote the binary response
for household i ði ¼ 1; . . . ; iÞ, interviewed by interviewer j j ¼ 1; . . . ; jð Þ
where,
Table 1. Incentives and Fieldwork Outcomes Before Reissuing for the Three
Surveys
NSW2015 NSW2016 UKHLS-IP
£10 £0 £5 £0 £10 £5
Interviews 1,387 1,228 1,772 1,664 1,020 469
Refusals 640 670 954 961 – –
Noncontact 285 289 265 250 – –
Other nonresponse 285 273 230 233 – –
Total nonresponse 1210 1232 1,449 1,444 660 374
Ineligible 368 370 383 359 175 88
Cooperation Rate 68% 65% 65% 63% – –
Response Rate 53% 50% 55% 54% 61% 56%
Total issued sample 2,965 2,830 3,604 3,467 1,855 931
NOTE.— Only total nonresponse is available for UKHLS-IP at first issue.
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yij¼
1
0
cooperation=response
refusal=nonresponse
:
8<
:
yij is assumed to follow a Bernoulli distribution, with conditional response
probabilities pij ¼ Pr yij ¼ 1
 
and 1 pij ¼ Pr yij ¼ 0
 
. The multilevel lo-
gistic regression model accounting for interviewer effects takes the form
log
pij
1 pij
 
¼ b0 þ b1x1ij þ x
0
ijbþ z
0
jaþ l0j þ l1j;
where b0 is the intercept, b1is the coefficient for the incentive condition; x1ij is
a dummy indicator of the incentive group for household i within the assign-
ment of interviewer j; x
0
ij is a vector of household-level characteristics with co-
efficient vector b; z
0
j is a vector of interviewer-level covariates with coefficient
vector a; l0j is a random intercept; and l1j is a random coefficient for the in-
centive dummy. The random intercept and slope, l0j and l1j, are assumed to
follow a normal distribution with zero mean and variance matrix Xl defined as
l0j
l1j
" #
 N 0;Xl
 
where Xl ¼
r2l0 0
rl01 r
2
u1
" #
;
where r2l0 is the intercept variance, r
2
l1 is the variance in slope, and rl01 is
the covariance between intercepts and slope. The positive values of ru01 in-
dicate that the effect of the incentive is greater for interviewers with higher
cooperation/response rates, although negative values indicate the opposite.
Cross-level interactions between interviewer characteristic variables and the
incentive variable are included to test whether observable characteristics of
interviewers are associated with variability in the effectiveness of deploying
incentives.
In standard face-to-face survey designs such as those considered here, iden-
tification of interviewer effects is complicated by the confounding of inter-
viewer assignments and areas (Campanelli and O’Muircheartaigh 1999;
Durrant et al. 2010). Failure to account for differences in the area-level compo-
sition of interviewer assignments can result in overestimation of the magnitude
of interviewer effects (O’Muircheartaigh and Campanelli 1998). Where there
is an overlap between interviewer assignments and areas, this can be mitigated
using a cross-classified, multi-level model (Durrant and Steele 2009).
However, this could not be done for the three datasets analyzed here because it
was not possible to obtain geographic identifiers for the two Welsh surveys,
and the UKHLS-IP did not contain sufficient crossing of interviewers and areas
to implement a cross-classified model. We therefore control for area character-
istics as fixed effects in the models for the UKHLS-IP data and assess the im-
pact this has on the interviewer random effects.
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Models are estimated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods
using MLwiN software (Fearn, Gelman, Carlin, Stern, Rubin et al. 2004;
Browne, Kelly, Charlton, and Pillinger 2016). The starting values for the fixed
effects are the second-order penalized quasi-likelihood (PQL) estimates. Priors
for the variance matrix are assumed to follow an inverse Wishart distribution
p X1l
 
 Wishartn n;ð Þ, where n is the number of rows in the variance matrix
and is an estimate for the true value of the variance matrix Xl (Browne et al.
2016). Because we are using MCMC, we also assess significance of coefficient
estimates using the change in model deviance information criterion (DIC)
(Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, and van der Linde 2002). Deviance information
criterion balances model fit and model complexity by taking the sum of the
posterior expectation (mean) of the deviance function Dð Þ and the effective
number of parameters pDð Þ. When comparing DIC values, a model with a
DIC value of at least 3 points lower than the previous model is considered to
have a significantly better fit (Spiegelhalter et al. 2002; Rasbash, Steele,
Browne, Goldstein, Charlton et al. 2012). The models had a burn-in length of
10,000 and 200,000 iterations. In order to avoid undue influence of starting
values, different burn-in lengths were tried, as recommended by Fearn et al.
(2004). The Brooks-Draper and Raftery-Lewis diagnostics were checked to de-
termine how long the chain must be run to obtain accurate posterior estimates
(Browne et al. 2016).
4. RESULTS
Table 2 presents the coefficient estimates, their standard deviations, and the
corresponding 95 percent credible intervals for the NSW2015 and NSW2016
models. As we saw in table 1, the coefficients for the incentive fixed effect are
positive for both surveys, although only for NSW2015 does the 95 percent
credible interval not include zero. The random coefficient variances of 0.09
and 0.07 are both significant, indicating that interviewers vary in the effective-
ness with which they deploy incentives. The DIC decreases by 8.0 for
NSW2015 and by 15.1 for NSW2016 when the interviewer random coefficient
is introduced, indicating an improvement in model fit.
The cross-level interactions between the three interviewer characteristic var-
iables—age, sex, and experience—and the incentive dummy are all nonsignifi-
cant, indicating that these interviewer characteristics do not explain between-
interviewer variability in the effectiveness of incentives on cooperation. The
DIC change, when these interaction terms are added, are 2 for NSW2015
and 4.1 for NSW2016, indicating a small improvement in model fit after the in-
clusion of these interactions for NSW2016. The covariance between the ran-
dom intercept and random coefficient ru01 is nonsignificant for both surveys,
with a point estimate of 0.02 for NSW2015 and of 0.02 for NSW2016. This
indicates that the effectiveness of incentive deployment between interviewers
10 Kibuchi et al. Do
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Table 2. Estimated Coefficients for the Final Model for NSW2015 and NSW2016 Cooperation)
NSW2015 NSW2016
Variable Category b SD 95% credible interval b SD 95 percent Credible Interval
Intercept 0.239 0.320 0.409 0.857 0.651 0.100 0.455 0.848
Incentive (no incentive) Incentive 0.288 0.363 0.433 0.991 0.114 0.111 0.106 0.331
Interviewer age (young) Lower middle 0.048 0.237 0.406 0.526
Upper Middle 0.345 0.233 0.103 0.808 0.154 0.155 0.154 0.456
Old 0.428 0.278 0.102 0.982
Interviewer Experience (less) Lower middle 0.027 0.255 0.535 0.471
Upper middle 0.403 0.285 0.170 0.959 0.309 0.195 0.691 0.074
Highest 0.386 0.274 0.159 0.929 0.371 0.224 0.804 0.071
Interviewer Sex (Female) Male 0.048 0.237 0.406 0.526 0.134 0.132 0.395 0.124
Incentive (£10 per adult)
*Gender (Female)
£10 per adult *Male 0.035 0.180 0.316 0.385 0.268 0.147 0.556 0.019
Incentive (£10 per adult)
*Age (young)
£10* Lower middle 0.021 0.269 0.540 0.506
£10* Upper Middle 0.124 0.264 0.638 0.394 0.063 0.172 0.271 0.402
£10* Old 0.412 0.317 1.035 0.216
Incentive (£5) *Experience (less) £10*Lower Middle 0.027 0.281 0.587 0.516
£10*Upper Middle 0.176 0.312 0.791 0.434 0.546 0.222 0.107 0.984
£10*Highest 0.109 0.297 0.480 0.688 0.006 0.246 0.476 0.486
r2u0 ¼ varðlojÞ 0.199 0.065 0.097 0.349 0.137 0.045 0.067 0.243
r2u1 ¼ var l1j
 
0.085 0.047 0.025 0.205 0.070 0.037 0.022 0.161
ru01 ¼ covðl0j;l1jÞ 0.020 0.042 0.073 0.096 0.028 0.035 0.108 0.016
DIC 4765.957 6567.170
N¼ 3, 925 (for NSW 2015) N¼ 5, 175 (for NSW 2016).
NOTE.—NSW2015: £10 Incentive
NSW2016: £5 Incentive
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is not related to the overall cooperation rate an interviewer achieves on their as-
signment of addresses.
Figure 1 plots the difference in the mean predicted rates of cooperation for
each interviewer derived as fitted values from the models in table 2. Each dot
in figure 1 represents an interviewer, with the left Y axis being the difference
in the cooperation rates for households in the incentive and nonincentive con-
ditions. The triangles show the mean overall cooperation rate (plotted against
the right Y axis) for each interviewer across all eligible households in their as-
signment. There is substantial variability across interviewers in the effective-
ness of the incentive in obtaining cooperation. For NSW2015, the difference in
the cooperation rate ranges from 9 to þ13 percentage points, with the corre-
sponding values for NSW 2016 being7 andþ16 percentage points.
Not all of this variability is attributable to how skilful interviewers are in
deploying incentives and simply reflects random variability in response pro-
pensities across interviewer assignments. We can get a better sense of the effect
of interviewers on incentive effectiveness by taking the expected cooperation
rate for an incentivized household using interviewer from the top and bottom
deciles of the random coefficient variance, r21j, while holding all other variables
constant. For NSW2015, this shows that interviewers in the top performing
decile achieve an expected cooperation rate of 67 percent for incentivized
households compared with 64 percent for those in the bottom decile and com-
pared with 68 percent for the median interviewer for nonincentivized house-
holds, a substantial difference. The corresponding figures for NSW2016 are 64
percent and 58 percent for the top and bottom deciles, respectively, and 65 per-
cent for the median interviewer for nonincentivized households. There is no
obvious relationship between the overall response rate and the effectiveness of
Figure 1. Difference in Predicted Rates of Cooperation for Incentive and
Nonincentive Households by Interviewer for NSW 2015 (Left Panel) and NSW
2016 (Right Panel).
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the incentive within interviewers, so we find no evidence that interviewers
who are, on average, better at obtaining cooperation are also more effective in
deploying the incentive.
Next, we turn to the same analysis of UKHLS-IP, which, as a household lon-
gitudinal survey, has a rather different design from the Welsh cross-sectional
surveys, although we focus on wave one only. Table 3 presents the estimated
coefficients, standard deviations, and corresponding 95 percent credible inter-
vals. These are consistent with those presented in table 2; the fixed effect for
the incentive predicting response is positive but nonsignificant, and the inter-
viewer characteristics—age, gender, and experience—are all nonsignificant, as
are the interactions between these variables and the incentive fixed effect.
Three of the area level variables are significantly associated with response;
the higher the urbanicity and population mobility, the lower the level of survey
response, while areas with a housing structure comprising more terraced hous-
ing and vacant properties have higher levels of response. Even after controlling
for these differences in area composition, the random coefficient for the incen-
tive is significant, with a variance of 0.13 (95 percent credible interval 0.03–
0.35). This suggests that the between-interviewer variability in the effective-
ness of the incentive is caused by interviewer behavior rather than by differen-
ces in the sorts of people they have been allocated to interview. The model
DIC decreases by 3.10 with the inclusion of the random coefficient, so we also
find evidence of a between-interviewer difference in the effectiveness of the in-
centive on this alternative measure of statistical significance.
As with the Welsh surveys, the covariance between the random intercept
and random slope is positive but with a 95 percent credible interval that
includes zero. We therefore also find no support from UKHLS-IP for the idea
that interviewers who, on average, obtain higher response rates might also be
more effective in their deployment of incentives.
Figure 2 plots the difference in the mean predicted rates of response for each
interviewer derived as fitted values from the models in table 3. It shows a very
similar pattern to what we saw in figure 1 for the Welsh surveys, with substan-
tial between-interviewer variation in response rates between high and low in-
centive groups with a range of 21 to þ18 percentage points. Visually, there
is more evidence of a positive correlation between difference in response rates
and the overall mean response rates for each interviewer, although this differ-
ence is not statistically significant.
5. DISCUSSION
John Wannamaker, the American department store magnate, once (apocry-
phally) observed that “half the money I spend on advertising is wasted; the
trouble is I don’t know which half.” The same sentiment might also be applied
to monetary incentives in surveys (Rossolatos, 2013), although in this context,
Interviewers and Incentives Effects on Cooperation Rates 13 Do
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Table 3. Estimated Coefficients for the Final Model for Innovation Panel
Response
Variable (reference
category) b SD
95% credible
interval
Intercept Category 0.383 0.647 0.893 1.679
Incentive (£5 per adult) £10 per adult 0.217 0.549 0.471 1.767
Neighbourhood Characteristics
Urbanicity 0.213 0.078 0.368 0.061
Housing structure 0.302 0.077 0.153 0.455
Population Mobility 0.269 0.094 0.455 0.089
Interviewer Characteristics
Gender (Female) Male 0.477 0.304 1.089 0.117
Age (less than 40 years) 41 to 50 years 0.550 0.654 0.764 1.852
50 to 60 years 0.730 0.512 0.246 1.754
> 60 years 0.251 0.675 1.103 1.567
Experience (less than 2 yrs.) 3 to 6 years 0.355 0.326 1.010 0.258
7 to 9 years 0.658 0.413 1.479 0.151
>10 years 0.869 0.570 1.998 0.220
Cross-level interactions
Incentive (£5 per adult)
*Gender (Female)
£10 per adult *Male 0.140 0.143 0.345 0.624
Incentive (£5 per adult)
*Age (less than 40 years)
£10 per adult
*41 to 50 years
0.024 0.611 1.250 1.147
£10 per adult
*50 to 60 years
0.110 0.551 1.194 0.951
£10 per adult
*> 60 years
0.077 0.567 1.040 1.165
Incentive (£5 per adult)
*Experience (less than
2 yrs.)
£10 per adult
*3 to 6 years
0.035 0.266 0.496 0.552
£10 per adult
*7 to 9 years
0.366 0.327 0.273 1.010
£10 per adult
*>10 years
0.198 0.428 0.642 1.045
Random intercept
r20jk ¼ varðlojkÞ 1.143 0.359 0.582 1.984
Random coefficient
r21k ¼ var l1kð Þ 0.126 0.085 0.028 0.349
Covariance of intercept &
coefficient
l01 ¼ covðlok ;l1kÞ
(interviewer)
0.130 0.180 0.274 0.349
DIC 2529.201
UKHLS-IP, wave one, N¼ 2, 123.
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considerably more than half of the money is wasted. This is because incentives
generally add only a few percentage points or so to the headline response rate.
It follows therefore that the majority of respondents in any survey using a mon-
etary incentive would have agreed to provide an interview anyway. A small
minority, however, are susceptible to being converted from refusal to interview
with the provision of an incentive, and this in turn raises the possibility that
interviewers might play an important role in determining the rate of such
“conversions.” While there are other reasons for providing monetary incentives
than boosting the response rate, this remains the primary rationale in most
cases. It is therefore important to understand how best to maximize the effec-
tiveness of monetary incentives in converting refusals to interviews. This is all
the more pressing, given the likely need to place greater reliance on incentives
to maintain response rates in the future.
Our findings show that across three different UK face-to-face surveys, inter-
viewers vary significantly in how effective they are at using incentives to in-
crease rates of cooperation. The effects we observe are substantively and
statistically significant; our model estimates show that exchanging interviewers
from the top to the bottom decile of interviewer performance would yield an
expected 14 to 15 percentage point increase in the effect of the incentive rela-
tive to the control condition. We have speculated that this heterogeneity results
from interviewer expectations and behavior, particularly the use of “tailoring”
of doorstep interactions (Groves and Couper 1998) and greater confidence in
the probability of obtaining an interview when an incentive is offered (Singer,
Frankel, and Glassman 1983; Singer, Hoewyk, and Maher 2000). However,
while the between-interviewer variability in the effectiveness of incentives was
consistent across the three surveys, we found no significant predictor of this
variance among the covariates considered: interviewer age, sex, and
Figure 2. Difference in Predicted Rates of Response for Incentive and
Nonincentive Households by Interviewer for UKHLS-IP.
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experience. Nor was variability in incentive effectiveness related to the overall
response rate an interviewer achieved. Therefore, the mechanisms underpin-
ning this effect remain unclear.
Our focus in this article has been on the effect of incentives on cooperation
because incentives seem likely to exert their primary influence on the coopera-
tion decision. However, it is possible that they also have an effect on contact
rates and other categories of nonresponse. We have therefore also carried out
the analyses reported here with the dependent variable specified as response/
nonresponse for the two surveys where full outcome codes were available be-
fore any reissues. The results are substantively identical to those reported here,
so we find no evidence of a differential effect of interviewers on cooperation
relative to total nonresponse.1
Our findings have implications for survey practice. The approach we have
implemented here to identify interviewer effectiveness in deploying incentives
could be used as a way of identifying underperforming interviewers. This sort
of monitoring is now implemented routinely in many large-scale survey opera-
tions, often in real-time, as a way of identifying interviewers who show signs
of missing fieldwork targets (Kreuter 2013; Edwards, Maitland, and O’Connor
2017). It should be feasible to include “incentive performance” alongside other
forms of paradata to raise flags against particular interviewers on this perfor-
mance dimension, although how this would be adapted to designs in which all
households are offered the same incentive would require further consideration.
Relatedly, the ability to identify interviewers at the top end of the perfor-
mance distribution offers opportunities to better understand the types of strate-
gies employed by more successful interviewers. Information on successful
approaches to incentive use that are identified in this way could be integrated
into sections of interviewer briefings that address doorstep approaches, both
for generic and survey-specific training. Indeed, simply highlighting to inter-
viewers that the way they administer incentives can have substantial effects on
their response outcomes may, on its own, have some effect on their subsequent
behavior.
While our methodological approach and findings represent an advance in
our understanding of how interviewers and incentives interact to promote co-
operation, this study is not without limitations, and these should be acknowl-
edged. First, the surveys we have considered all use a relatively narrow range
of incentive values which are administered to all households in the incentive
condition. Caution should be exercised in generalizing to contexts where larger
incentives are used or where incentives of varying values are targeted at differ-
ent subgroups of the sample based on response propensities (Lavrakas,
McPhee, and Jackson 2016). Our results also have little relevance to the use of
incentives in online surveys, which comprise a large and growing proportion
of total survey volume, both in the United Kingdom and internationally.
1. These analyses are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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We were also able to link the sample file and response outcome data to a
limited range of area and interviewer characteristics. It is possible that with
stronger controls for differences between interviewers in the composition of
their allocated addresses, the magnitude of the effects we have observed might
be reduced. The paucity of interviewer characteristic data available to us, par-
ticularly the absence of variables measuring interviewer attitudes, beliefs, and
behaviors, means that our ability to explain why some interviewers are more ef-
fective in deploying monetary incentives than others is weak. These limita-
tions, we contend, represent potentially fruitful avenues for future research.
Appendix 1: Descriptions of Survey Sample Designs &
Methodology
NATIONAL SURVEY FORWALES FIELD TEST 2015
(NSW 2015)
The sample design of the NSW2015 used a stratified, single-stage, random se-
lection of addresses across Wales drawn from the small user Postcode Address
File (PAF). Adults 16 years old or over within each sampled household were
interviewed face-to-face, and each interview lasted for an average of 25
minutes. When a household contained more than one adult, a single adult was
randomly selected. The aim of the incentive experiment was to assess the extent
to which response rates improved by offering respondents a £10 gift card upon
completing an interview. The experimental group (N¼ 2,965) received a £10
conditional incentive, and the second group received no incentive (N¼ 2,830).
The households which were randomly selected to be offered a conditional £10
received advance letters mentioning the incentive, while the other half of house-
holds received advance letters that contained no information about incentives.
To ensure that any differences in response rates between respondents who were
offered £10 and those offered no incentive are not attributed to any interviewer
abilities, addresses that were offered incentives were randomly allocated within
each interviewer assignment. The survey was implemented by a team of 86
interviewers with the number of households interviewed by each interviewer
ranging between 14 and 134. Further details on the NSW2015 sample design
can be found in Hanson, Sullivan, and Mcgowan (2015).
NATIONAL SURVEY FORWALES INCENTIVE
EXPERIMENT 2016 (NSW 2016)
The Welsh government commissioned the office for National Office of
National Statistics (ONS) to conduct the National Survey for Wales 2016
(NSW 2016) incentive experiment between July and October 2016. The
Interviewers and Incentives Effects on Cooperation Rates 17 Do
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sample was drawn from the Postcode Address File (PAF). The stratification
was done by local authority (LA), using an allocation designed to ensure a
minimum effective sample size was achieved in each LA based on esti-
mated response rate. Further details on the sample design can be found in
Aumeyr et al. (2017). Half of the addresses in each odd numbered quota2
were offered a £5 incentive conditional on participation (N¼ 3,604), and
addresses with even quota number were offered no incentive (N¼ 3,467).
The incentive experiment ran from July to October 2016. Originally, it was
intended to run the experiment until December 2016, but it was terminated
at the end of October 2016 because both experimental and control groups
experienced lower response rates at 55 percent and 54 percent, respectively,
which were lower than expected. With an aim of boosting response rates, a
new £10 incentive conditional on participation was introduced to the full
sample in November 2016. This study only considers the experiment sam-
ple size from July to October 2016 that consists of 7,071 households across
the two conditions. There were 85 interviewers working on the survey with
the minimum and maximum number of interviews per interviewer ranging
between one and 219. Sociodemographic characteristics of ten (12 percent)
interviewers who conducted interviews on 249 (3.5 percent) households
were missing because they did not provide consent. The final analysis sam-
ple had 6,122 households after excluding 742 (10.5 percent) ineligible
households and those interviewed by interviewers with missing sociodemo-
graphic characteristics.
UK HOUSEHOLD LONGITUDINAL SURVEY
INNOVATION PANELWAVE ONE (UKHLS-IP)
The sample for wave one of the UK Household Longitudinal Survey
Innovation Panel (UKHLS-IP) was clustered and stratified, consisting of
2,786 addresses from 120 primary sampling units (PSUs) from the Postcode
Address File (PAF). The incentive experiment was comprised of three condi-
tions, with each condition receiving a different conditional incentive: Group
one was offered £5 per adult, group two was offered £10 per adult, and group
three was offered £5 per adult, rising to £10 per adult if all adults in the house-
hold completed interviews. Single person households randomly assigned to
group three received £5 initially that increased to £10 if they participated. For
the purposes of our analysis, groups two and three are combined. Note that all
households were also sent an unconditional £5 incentive with the advance let-
ter. There were twenty-seven households in the UKHLS-IP that did not suc-
cessfully merge with interviewer data due to lack of common unique
identifiers. The neighborhood characteristic variables are drawn from the
2. Each quota contained between twenty and thirty addresses on average.
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census and were available for England only. This resulted in the exclusion of
342 households (12.3 percent) from Wales and Scotland. In addition, thirty-
one (1.1 percent) households in five MSOAs in England did not successfully
merge with Innovation Panel data due to lack of common unique identifica-
tion codes. Therefore, the final analysis sample contained 2,123 households
after excluding 263 (9.4 percent) ineligible households. The number of inter-
viewers working on the UKHLS-IP was 107, with the number of households
interviewed by each interviewer ranging between two and fifty. Further details
about the UKHLS-IP can be found in Boreham and Constantine (2008)
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